Dr. Nejat Tamzok
Not: This article was published on the Eurasia Review on August 4, 2026: https://www.eurasiareview.com/04082026-a-nuclear-countdown-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-the-geopolitics-of-akkuyu-and-el-dabaa-analysis/
The Eastern Mediterranean remains one of global geopolitics’ most volatile fault lines, where sovereignty claims, energy competition, and shifting power balances tightly intersect. Maritime jurisdiction disputes among littoral states, market rivalries over newly discovered natural gas reserves, mass migration corridors, and conflict rings extending from the Middle East to the Red Sea have transformed the region into a persistent series of crises. Yet, in the shadow of all these tensions, two colossal projects are quietly rising on opposite shores of the Mediterranean, preparing to introduce a critical new dimension to the region’s security and energy architecture: the El Dabaa and Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs).
The Mediterranean’s Twin Nuclear Plants
Egypt’s El Dabaa, under construction roughly 170 kilometers west of Alexandria, and Türkiye’s Mersin-Akkuyu plant, rising on its southern coast, are technically identical: both facilities utilize third-generation VVER-1200 reactor technology designed by the Russian state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom, and each consists of four units with a total capacity of 4,800 megawatts.
The backstories of these first nuclear power plants in the Eastern Mediterranean are also remarkably similar: Both Türkiye and Egypt launched their nuclear ambitions in the mid-20th century. Both countries made repeated attempts to acquire a nuclear power plant, only to be stymied for decades by financial constraints, technological shortcomings, and global political hurdles. Ultimately, Türkiye in 2010 and Egypt in 2015 sat down with the Russian Federation to sign intergovernmental agreements. Construction commenced at Akkuyu in 2018 and at El Dabaa in 2022. The first unit at Akkuyu is scheduled to be commissioned within this year, with full plant operation targeted by the end of 2028. In Egypt, the first unit is expected to enter service in 2028, with all four units operational by 2030. Once fully operational, both facilities will supply roughly 10 percent of their respective countries’ total electricity demand.
Radical Divergence in Ownership and Financing Models
Despite their technical and historical parallels, the two projects diverge sharply in their financing and ownership structures. In the El Dabaa Project, Rosatom serves merely as an engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) main contractor. Financing is structured with an 85 percent Russian export credit and 15 percent Egyptian state equity; Egypt will repay the loan with interest once commercial operations begin. Ownership of the facility rests entirely with the Egyptian State. Operation of the plant will be carried out by the owner and manager of the project, the Nuclear Power Plants Authority (NPPA) of Egypt, with technical support from Rosatom.
At Akkuyu, however, an unprecedented model in the global nuclear industry was deployed: the Build-Own-Operate (BOO) framework. Under this model, the ownership, investment burden, and operational risks of Akkuyu were initially assigned 100 percent to Russia, with a binding clause stipulating that Russia’s stake cannot fall below 51 percent even if future equity transfers occur. Although Rosatom has occasionally floated the possibility of selling minority stakes, its initial 100 percent ownership remains unchanged to date.
Akkuyu stands as the sole large-scale nuclear power plant in the world constructed under this model. In other major projects managed by Rosatom—such as Rooppur in Bangladesh and Paks II in Hungary—host nations rejected the BOO model, opting instead for traditional contracting structures similar to El Dabaa. In Tianwan, China, Rosatom acts solely as a technology supplier. The most contentious aspect of the BOO model in nuclear investments is that it relegates the host nation on its own sovereign territory to the role of a “captive market” purchasing electricity from a plant owned by a foreign state.
A Century-Long Dependency
Spanning a lifecycle of nearly a century—from initial planning and construction to operation and eventual decommissioning—nuclear power investments inherently generate long-term technological and economic dependencies. This dynamic is especially pronounced in Russia’s overseas energy projects. While Egypt enters a multi-decadal loop of technological dependency through El Dabaa, extending from fuel supply to operation and maintenance, Türkiye expands its existing reliance on Russia in natural gas and coal directly into nuclear energy.
Because ownership rests entirely with Russia, the dependency profile for Türkiye is markedly sharper. It is frequently highlighted that in the event of potential tensions in Türkiye-Russia relations, the risk of curtailed electricity generation could create a structural vulnerability that constrains Ankara’s diplomatic maneuverability. On the other hand, while territorial sovereignty formally remains with Türkiye, the ownership of strategic infrastructure is transferred to Moscow. The facility’s critical infrastructure—such as the nuclear island housing the radioactive core, power generation and grid transmission equipment, emergency backup power and cooling mechanisms, and the digital and physical security systems safeguarding the plant’s operational integrity—is under the operational and control authority of another state. Elements on the plant site, such as port facilities and radar systems, also fall under this scope. This situation means that a highly strategic facility within the borders of a NATO member state is placed under the de facto control of another state.
Energy Infrastructure as a Geopolitical Anchor
The central debate surrounding these massive facilities is whether they will simply generate electricity or introduce new geopolitical challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean. This question is attracting increasing attention in contemporary geopolitical debates.
Naturally, these plants are being constructed to meet the growing power demands of Türkiye and Egypt. Yet, rising on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, these nuclear structures may also carry broader geopolitical implications that could reframe the region’s security and energy architecture. Among these, the most frequently raised argument is that these two investments by Moscow represent a modern execution of its strategy to secure a permanent presence in “warm seas”. Furthermore, when evaluating the strategic locations of Akkuyu and El Dabaa alongside Russia’s military posture in the region—including the Tartus naval facility and Hmeymim airbase in Syria, both diminished and in flux since the 2024 fall of the Assad government—analysts point to an indirect complementarity between these civil and military elements.
While Akkuyu and El Dabaa are civilian energy facilities bound by international agreements and subject to IAEA safeguards. However, Akkuyu sits on Türkiye’s most strategic coastline facing the Eastern Mediterranean, while El Dabaa lies along a critical corridor near the Suez Canal and the Libyan border. The dedicated port facilities constructed at these sites carry the potential to serve as long-term logistical operational hubs adjacent to vital maritime chokepoints for generations to come.
Nuclear power plants are strategic assets requiring the highest level of physical, military, and cyber defense. The crux of the debate lies in who will determine the scope of these legitimate security requirements, and who will satisfy them and how. In Akkuyu, Russia’s complete ownership grants Moscow broader leverage to negotiate the deployment of air defense, radar, and cybersecurity infrastructure under the rationale of facility protection—far beyond what conventional, non-BOO models would permit. Indeed, it is possible that additional security measures, such as designated maritime safety zones or no-fly zones around these multi-billion-dollar installations, could be put forward.
Conclusion: Smart Power Projection
Both Türkiye and Egypt view nuclear energy as a rational tool for power mix diversification amid rising electricity demand, volatile fuel markets, and carbon reduction commitments. Furthermore, the host country’s territorial sovereignty and regulatory oversight authority legally remain intact. In this regard, assuming that these projects automatically signal a strategy of “covert military deployment” would be an overly ambitious and speculative approach.
Nevertheless, the long-term dependency created by Akkuyu and El Dabaa is a concrete contractual reality. These projects represent a prime example of modern “smart power” projection, at least through the lens of economic and technological binding. The extent to which this structural dependency evolves into military-strategic leverage will only become clear over the coming decades, shaped by the broader trajectory of Ankara-Moscow and Cairo-Moscow relations.
Ankara, August 2026, enerjipolitik.com